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IN THE

Supreme Court
OF THE

State of

Utah

JERRY SINE and DO·RA A. SINE,

Respondents,

CASE NO·.
7386

vs
MILDRED IONA HARPER, Admin-

BRIEF OF

istratrix of the estate of Cathrine RESPO·NDENTS
Jensen, deceased,

Appellant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
:Since the statement of facts in the brief of app·ellant
does not comply with Rule VIII, sub-paragraph 1, of
the rules of the Sup-reme Court, respondents request
that the said statement of facts be ignored by this Honorable Court. Rather than attempt to correct that
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statement and supply transcript references to support
the changes, we restate the facts of the case, supported
by references to the transcript, as required by the rules.
The respondents purchased a large tract of land
in Block 61, Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, a portion of Salt Lake County, in February 1946 (R. 48, 53,
Exhibit B). One additional parcel "ras purchased in
the Sl>'ring of 1947 which completed respondents' ownership of all the south property in Block 3 except for the
tract involved in this litigation and one other (R. 55).
Exhibit B is -a plat of this property, which in outline is
reproduced here. All of the open area was purchased in
1946, the shaded area was purchased in 1947, and the
property in dispute is shown in black.
The respondents engaged a real estate agent, ·Mr.
·Dowell, ''to purchase the property west of my property,
the corner prop·erty, so that I could square my property
that was in the rear" (R. 64). Mr. Dowell testified that
he _was engaged to purchase ''the property including
the duplex adjoining his auto court" (R. 108). Mr.
Dowell determined that Cathrine Jensen owned the
property and contacted her at her residence on 8th South
in, Salt Lake City, telling her he was a real estate agent,
and: ''I understand you own some property on West
North Temple adjoining the Bishop-,s Auto Court." She
replied that she did an~ there was a discussion of p~rice
and _Mrs. Jensen aaked who wanted to buy it. Mr.
Dowell rep1ied, ''The man who owns the ·auto court
next to it, Mr. Sine," and Mrs. Jensen replied that, ''He
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should pay more for it." (R. 117). At a later conversation between Mr. Dowell and Mrs. J ens,en there was a
further discussion· concerning the price and l\1r. Dowell
said, ''The fact remains, you are getting more than
$100 a foot for it. This buyer is going to tear the house
down anyway,'' and advised her that a tract do\vn the
street had been sold for $85 a foot (R. 121).
Mr. Dowell later testified that on the occasion of
his first visit he advised Mrs. Jensen that the property
was more valuable to his client than to anyone else and
''that is the main reason he is p,aying $8,000. The main
reason is to straighten this out. However, he has in mind
building a cafe there'' (R. 194). And Mrs. Jensen replied, ''Well, I have had in mind doing something of
that nature myself, if my health permitted or if I had
somebody to entrust it to whom I could rely upon. I
still might do that. * * * * The children don't want me
to sell it but I am glad to be free of it for the reason
that I just can't take care of it" (R. 195).
Exhibit C vvas ·executed by the respondents and
then by l\frs. Jensen (R. 62, 110), and subsequently Exhibit D was executed, first by the respondents (R. 71,
122). Both testified that they did not read the document
( R. 82, 90, and 97). Mr. Sine testified that he relied
upon his realtor and his attorney to protect him. (R. 72,
73, 82, 90, and 92), and both testified that they thought
they were buying the p~roperty adjoining theirs and
would not have signed Exhibit D had they known that
a 25¥2 foot strip was being omitted (R. 79, 82, and 98).
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Mr. Sine testified that the entire 75 feet had been
used together, the vacant 2~ feet for the parking of
cars, dumping of refuse, and stringing of clotheslines
for the benefit of the ocrupants of the duplex (R. 58,
61, and 62). ~Irs. Sine and nlr. Do1vell testified to substantia1ly the same thing (R. 99 and 196). Nothing
separates the t'vo tracts (R. 50, 76, 169, and 176). The
sewer plug for servicing the house is on the 25.% foot
strip (R. -!9, 61-62) and a little way into the vacant
piece (R. 49, 87). ~Ir. Sine testified that after the contract here involved was entered into he took p·ossession
of the entire tract, removed the rubbish, removed the
shed from the property, and continued to use l.t to p-ark
cars both for occupants of the dup1ex and for other guests
of the motor court (R. 74, 75, 77, and 83). Mr. Sine
learned that Exhibit D covered only 49% feet on July 24,
1948 (R. 80). It appeared in testimony that l\1:rs. Jensen
paid taxes on the 25%-foot .strip on November 24, 1947,
and it must therefore be assumed that sh·e was aware
of the description in Exhibit D on that date (R. 186).
~fr. Dowell testified that he obtained an abstract
from Mrs. Jensen (R. 123) and from it a .stenographer
in his office prepared Exhibit D (R. 133). This abstract
was apparently Exhibit 1, and Mr. Dowell testified that
he assumed he referred his secretary to page 61 of the
abstract since that page is a deed to Cathrine Brady
(R. 139-140). He testified that he knew the tract he was
attempting to buy was more than 491f2 feet and that if
he had noticed the description of 49% feet he would have
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known it was erroneous (R. 141). The plat of property
in the front of Exhibit 1 shows the entire 75 feet for
whieh res'pondents were negotiating a.s a unit and the
later entries . in- that abstract show a division of the
p-roperty into 49¥2 feet and 25 0 feet. ~1r. Dowell testified that the property was over-priced at e;8,500 on the
assumption that the entire 75 feet 'vas being purchased
(R. 141).
The appellant offered testimony from the daughters
of the deceased Cathrine Jensen, the husband, and the
former husband of the deceased as to her state of mind
and her intentions, based upon purported conversations
with them, all of which were in September 1947 or later,
except the conversation with Mrs. Wheeler, purporting
to have taken place on the date the ~earnest money receipt, Exhibit C, was signed (R. 210-211) and one with
Mrs. Freeman soon after the sale. (R. 171). Mrs.
Wheeler's testimony was that after the conversation
between Mr. Dowell and her mother, her mother told
her that the people who owned the tourist court wanted
to buy her property and the mother suggested they go
up to look at it, and after they arrived at the property
this statement was made, according to Mrs. Wheeler:
''A. Well mother, she said, 'They are not
buying all of this. ' She said, ' They are buying
this that the house is on', and showed me what it
was and I asked her why ·she wasn't selling the
other twenty-five feet and she said, 'I didn't buy
that with the place and I am not selling it with
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the place.' She said she wanted to put a hamburger stand some place on it and she said, 'I
am not selling the place.' " (R. 210-211)
Mrs. "rheeler did not know 'vhat papers had been signed
at that time but her mother said she "had sold it'' and
that was all (R. 211).
The appellant, another daughter of Cathrine J ensen, testified that there had never been any buildings on
the 25% foot strip or any clotheslines (R. 158). She
testified to a conversation with her mother in October
1948 in 'Yhich her mother wanted her father (Mrs. Jensen's first husband, C. W. Biddinger,) to build a threeor four-room house on the property (R. 15~). And in
the fall of 1947 ~Irs. Jensen indicated that she wanted
~fr. Biddinger to build a hamburger place or lunch
stand on the property (R. 156).
Another daughter, Mrs. Freeman, also testified that
there "\Yere no clotheslines or sheds or outbuildings on
the 25_0 foot piece of property (R. 169), and testified
that she discussed that piece of property' after the transaction with Mr. Sine right after the property had been
sold, and:
''A. 1\Iother said I could go ahead and use
the twenty-fiv.e and one half foot piece and n1y
father could build us a little hamburger place and
little. lunchstand and she thought he "\Vas a good
cook and he could cook and I could help him. She
said that would be adequate, it would be plenty
large for a little five cent place and since there
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was tourist cabins around there and she thought
that would be a nice place and I mentioned that
to Mrs. Sine * * * " (R. 172).
Mrs. FTeeman also testified that in June 1948 her mother
told her that if her father did not want to build a lunchstand he could build a little home on the North Temple
property (R. 173-174).
Mr. Biddinger, the first husband, testified to a conversation in September 1947 in which Mrs. Jensen indicated ·she wanted ?im to build a hamburger stand on
the p·rop!erty (R. 179) and that in June 1948 she indicated
a desire to have him build a little house on the same
pie·ce (R. 180).
James C. Jensen, the husband of Cathrine Jensen,
at the time of the sale here involved, testified that after
the transaction with Mr. Sine Mrs. Jensen talked of
letting ·Mrs. Freeman and her father build a hamburger
stand on the property (R. 185); also, that on November
24, 1947, Mrs. Jensen paid the taxes on the 25,0 foot
strip (R. 185). Before the sale involved here, Mrs.
Jensen had talked of building some cabins on the 250
foot strip (R. 184).

CROSS-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
1. It was error for the Court to admit testimony
of conversations with the deceased Cathrine Jensen occurring long after the sale to the respondents.
2.

It was error for the Court to admit testimony
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of conversations with the deceased shortly after the time
of sale to the respondents.
3. It was error for the Court to refuse to strike
the testimony of l\Irs. Harp_er of conversations with the
deceased after the sale (R. 152-153.).

ARGUMENT
We will argue, first, -our three cros·s-assignments
of error and will then argue the five points discussed by
the appellant in her brief.

I.
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO· ADMIT
TESTIMONY OF CONVERSATIONS WITH THE
DECEASED CATHERINE JENSEN O·CCUR.RING
LONG AFTER THE SALE TO THE RESPONDENTS.
Logically, our cross-assignments of error should
be argued after the assignm·ents of the appellant. They
are argued first in this brief so that the Court will
understand the nature of the testimony upon which appellant relied in defense, so that under point V of the
appellant's argument (point VIII of this brief) the
Court can exclude from consideration evidence which
was properly inadmissible and it can therefore he ignored in resolving ap·p·ellant's point V.
Appellant's testimony of conversations with the deceased occurred in September 1947 or later, except that
l\f rs. Freeman testified to a conversation ''right .after''
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the prop·erty had been sold (R. 171) and Mrs. Wheeler
testified to a conversation ap1)larently on the date the
earnest money receipt was executed (R. 210). With
these two exceptions, testimony as to conversations with
the deceased was remote from the transaction involved
in this litigation· and not shown to have been safeguarded by admissions against interests or spontaneous exclamation, or otherwise. All of the statements are plainly self-serving and Mrs. Wheeler's could not have been
more to the point from the standpoint of the appellant
if the deceas·e·d had dictated it after the filing of the
lawsuit and as a means of .establishing her defense.
At the time the first witneas offered to testify concerning a conversation with -the deceased, the Court expre~sed doubt as to its admissibility (R. 150) but Counsel for the appellant argued that the testimony was
similar to some already offered by the respondents (and
now strenously objected to under point IV of app~ellant's
argument), as though that were a reason for admissibility (R. 150).
It is fundamental that self-serving declarations are
not admissible. Salt Lake Brewing Co. v. Hawke and
Andrews, 24 Utah 199, 208, 6·6 P. 1058; Clayton v. Ogden
State Bank, 82 Utah 564, 567, 26 P. 2d 545; Jones Commentaries on the Law of Evidence, page 1636; 31 C. J.
s. 948.
Salt Lake Brewing Co. v. Hawke and Andrews
(supra) was an action against two partners for money
loaned by the plaintiff. One partner obtained the money
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and absconded and the question was whether the absconding partner had authority to receive the money ·
for the partnership. Testimony was received tha.t the
innocent partner, after learning of the loss, had stated
that it 'vas not his responsibility. The Court said:

' "r

e are of the opinion that the admission
of this testin1ony was p·rejudicial error. It wa.s
already hearsay, and the statement of the defendant Andre"~s at that tim·e, after he found that
there """ould be an attempt made to hold him liable
for the money borrowed by his partner, was
simply a self-serving declaration, and was not
admissible for any purpose.''
Clayton v. Ogden State Bank (supra) wa.s an action
against an administrator for the value of services rendered. This Court held that plaintiff's testimony of a
letter sent by him to the deceased was prop·erly excluded:

'' * * * * Exhibit A, the letter from plaintiff
to deceased, is purely a .self-serving document and aside from the effect of the statute or other connecting evidence was properly rejected by the
trial court. ' '
The fact that Cathrine J en.sen was deceased does
not make her extra-judicial utterances admissible:
''The mere fact of death, alone, does not
render competent self-serving conduct, admissions or declarations of the deceased person during his lifetime.'' Jones Commentaries on the
I.~a\v of Evidence, page 1642.
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''The death of the declarant does not render
his self-serving declarations admissible, except
in jurisdictions where the rule has been changed
by statute. " 31 C. J. S. 953.
The annotation to this statement includes cases from 27
jurisdictions, but none from Utah. Without presuming
to know upon what theory the appellant offered this
testimony, we suggest that the most plausible theory wa.3
under the ''Res gestae'' exception to the hearsay rule.
With the exception of the two conversations indicated,
this theory is too far-fetched to deserve comment, and
we therefore consider this possibility under our point II.

II.
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO ADMIT
TESTIMO·NY O·F CONVERSATIONS WITH THE
DECEASED SHORTL·Y AFTER THE TIME OF
SALE TO THE RE:SiPONDENTS.
The testimnoy of Mra. Freeman was that her conversation with her mother took place right after the
property had been sold but that it took place at her
own home, and there is no indication that this conversation was the same day, or even the sam·e week (R. 171).
·Less remote was the conversation to which Mrs. Wheeler
testified. This one took place sometime after the conversation between Mr. Dowell and Mra. Jensen and after
Mrs. Wheeler and her mother, according to the testimony had ·driven to the prop,erty on _North Temple
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Street from 8th South (R. 209-211). Were the circumstances such as to permit the Court to receive this testimony under this exception to the hearsay rule?
Little "'"ould be accomplished by an attempt to examine into the reasons for the Res gestae exception to
the hearsay rule. This aspect of the p-roblem has been
before the court, as evidenced by Mr. Justice Wolfe's
special concurrence in State v. Rasmussen, 92 Utah 357
at pages 372 to 37±. The difficulties of the doctrine are
discussed by both Jones and Wigmore in their works on
evidence. W ~ assume that the exception i.s well-established and that the reasons for its existence are sufficient, and simply inquire into the decided cases in asking this Court to rule on the testimony received in this
case.
Jackson v. Utah Rapid Transit Co., 77 Utah 21, 37
to 40, 290 P. 970, wa.s an action for personal injuries in
which plaintiff obtained a judgment. Plaintiff offered
testimony of statements of defendant's motorman to the
plaintiff, her husband, a policeman, and in reporting the
accident over the telephone. On appeal this Court said,
at page 37:

"It is urged that the statements or declarations made by the motorman to the husband, to
the plaintiff, and to the policeman, were improperly received in evidence. Such testimony was received under the R.es gestae rule.''
In sustaining the lower court in receiving this testimony,
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this Court laid down the tests which should be observed,
as follows:
''In view of ·such considerations we think the
statements or declarations made by the motorman
to the husband, to the plaintiff, and to the policeman were J>~roperly received in evidence. They
were made so nearly coincident with the collision
-within three or four minutes thereafter-and
so closely connected with and related to it and
tended to ·explain or elucidate it, and made under
such circumstances as to pr·eclude premeditation
or design in the making of them, and sufficiently
shown to have been the result of the immediate
and p·resent influences of the transaction or preceding circumstances to which they related as to
render them admissible in evidence. The statements were in no sense self serving. While declarations made for or against one party or the other
to a cause is not itself a determining factor of
their admissibility and to be admissible it is not
essential that the declarations be disserving if
they otherwise have the requisites rendering them
admissible under the rule, still, declarations which
are disserving, as here they were, are more likely
to be instinctive and spontaneous and not the result of premeditation or design, than declarations
which, if made under other circumstances, may
be self-serving. As stated in the Cromeenes Case,
the basis of the rule is not admissions against interest, but trustworthiness of the statements,
p·rovable, not as the testimony of the declarant,
but as a part of the transaction itself, like any
other material fact or evidentiary detail.''
A.s to the telephone conversation, this Court held
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that it should have been excluded upon this r,easoning:

1

''The admission in evidence a.s to what the
motqrman stated w·hile talking over the telephone
stands on a somewhat different footing. As to
the question of time there was no substantial difference as to that statement and the other statements, but the character of the statement and the
circumstances under which it was made were materially different. The statement over the telephone was more in the nature of making a report,
the witness who testified concerning the making
of it not kno,Ying "~hether the statement was made
to some one in the defendant's office or to some
one at the police station; but in either case, the
motorman was merely reporting or giving notice
of an accident. Such a report or statement in
the very nature of things is not in.stinctive or
spontaneous though made within four minutes or
thereabouts after the accident. What prompted
or induced. the statements made to the husband
and the plaintiff was wholly different from that
which prompted or induced the statement over the
telephone. We thus think the statement made by
the motorman over the .telephone "\vas improp·erly
received. ' '

The principles of this case 'vere followed in Balle v.
Smith, 81 Utah 179 at 198, 17 P. 2d 224, where, after
quoting from Jackson v. Utah Rapid Transit Co., the
court said:
''The declaration offered meets the requirements or this rule, and should have been admitted.
It was made 'vithin a very fe'v 1ninute.s after the
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collision and before any of the parties concerned
had left the scene of the accident, so as to be contemporaneous within the rule announced. in the
Jackson C·ase. It was closely connected With and
related to the accident, and tended to explain and
elucidate it. It was made under circumstances
which indicate its spontaneous character and to
preclude premeditation or design or opportunity
for reflection, and is sufficiently shown to have
been the result of the immediate and present influences of the colli.sion. The nature of the occasion
was such as to cause shock and excitement, and to
render utterances within a few minutes by those
concerned in the accident as spontaneous and unreflecting. The declaration, though subsequent by
a few minutes, was yet near enough in time to
allow the assumption that the exciting influence
-continued.''
And, again, in State v. Rasmussen, supra, 92 Utah
357, 68 P. 2d 176, the circumstance out of which the
declaration arose was an automobile accident. This was
a prosecution of a hit and run driver and holds that
the trial court has some discretion in the admission of
declarations as part of Res gestae. In that case, one
l\:faloney testified as to the death of his companions and
his PFesence at the scene of the accident. The defendant
offered testimony of one Zackerson-that he arrived
at the scene of the accident apparently before anyone
else and while Maloney was still excited and was still
near the body of one of his companions and asked
l\faloney how it ha'ppened. The trial court refused to
let him ans,ver. The Supreme Court said, at page 361:
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"Had it been shown that the utterances offered to be proved were spontaneous, made under
stress or the excitement of the oocurrence, the
proffered proof might have presented a different
question. Nothing appears as to how soon after
the alleged accident occurred the statements were
made. The declaration offered may have been
made within a very few minutes after the accident
or so closely contemporaneous with it as to come.
within the rule laid down by this court in the case
of Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 f. (2d) 224, at
page 232 of the Pacific Reporter. It must be
recognized that the trial court has some diseretion in the admission of declarations of this character when the declarations are not immediate,
spontaneous, or made under stress of excitement.
The court should be fully satisfied by the evidence that a statement claimed to be res gestae
comes within the rule and meets all the requirements. It is not clearly apparent in the instant
case that the declaration made meets the requirements of the Balle v. Smith, supra."
The concurrence of l\Ir. Justice Wolfe in this case cautions that the tests to bring a declaration within this exception are S'pontaneity, absence of reflection, and the
automatic nature of the declaration, and that the discretion of the trial court lies in determining whether these
tests are satisfied.
A later, but similar, Utah ease is 1forton v. Hood,
105 Utah, 484, 143 P. 2d 434.
Wigmore states in Section 1749 of his Third Edition
of Evidence that this exception to the hearsay rule, as
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hers is ;supported by a circumstantial-probabilare a 11 Ot
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w·Igability of trustworthiness to these dec ara Ions.
more says:
''This circumstantial guarantee here consists
in the consideration, already noted, that in the
stress of nervous excitement the reflective faculties Inay be stilled and the utterance may become
the ul'\reflecting and 3incere expression of one's
actual impressions and belief."
And in the succeeding section ~fr. Wigmore con1menfs
on the requirements that there be a startling occasion,
a sta ten1ent 1nade before there has been time to fabricate
and that it relate to the circumstances of the occurrence.

1'he facts testified to by l\frs. Wheeler are that on
the day of ~I r. Do"rell's second conversation with her
1nother and after that conversation (whieh 1\lr. Do,vell
said \\"as quite lengthy (R. 121), J\irs. Jensen suggested
that they take a ride over to the North T·emple property
( R. 20!)). ..After they arrived there :airs. Jensen 'vHhout
an~T explanation of 'vhy any question was raised as to
"·hat 'vas covered b~T the contract she had just executed,
proceeded to give a self-serving statement of 'vhat 'vas
in the document and \vhat \vas not intended to be covered
h~· the document. There had been mueh more elapsed
time than the usual three or four minutes found by thjs
court to be sufficient, there was no showing that Mrs.
~Jensen

V\ras excited or that she lvas acting withont op-
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portunity to deliberate and to accomplish a purpose 'vith
her declaration.
Of course, the trial court did not believe the daug-hters of the decea~rd and this assignment of error becomes
important only in the event this Court should order a
new trial, and in that event, it 'vould be a guide on the
next trial. It 'viii be referred to again under Point VIII
of this argun1ent.
III.
IT ,,T_A_S EI{ROR FOR THE COURT TO REFUSE
TO STRIKE THE TESTI}fONY OF MRS. HARPER
OF CON,TERSATIONS \VITH THE DECEASED
_A_FTER THE SALE (R. 152-153).
No special point is made of this assignment of
error. The court was doubtful 'vhether this testimony
w·as admissible and suggested that counsel for respondents make a motion to strike if he deemed the evidence
inadmissible. This motion was made at a prop·er time
and was denied by the court (R. 152-153). This was
error in the same manner as the original ruling over
respondents' objections 'vas error.

IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN PER11ITTING HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF THE STATEJ\IENTS OF
PLAINTIFFS TO THEIR AGENT CONCERNING
INSTRUCTIONS TO PURCHASE THE 250-FOOT
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are all others, is .supported by a circumstantial probability of trustworthiness. Spontaneousness gives the probability of trustworthiness to these declarations. Wigmore says:
"This circumstantial guarantee here consists
in the consideration, already noted, that in the
stress of nervous excitement the reflective faculties may be stilled and the utterance n1ay beco1ne
the unreflecting and 3incere expression of one's
actual.impressions and belief.''
And in the succeeding section ~fr. Wigmore con1ments
on the requirements that there be a startling occasion,
a sta te1nent made he fore there has been time to fabricate
and that it relate to the circumstances of the occurrence.
The facts testified to by ~1rs. Wheeler are that on
the day of !1:r. Dowell's second conversation with her
mother- and after that conversation (which 1\fr. Do,vell
said was quite lengthy (R. 121), l\1rs. Jensen suggested
that they take a ride over to the North T'emple property
(R. 209). After they arrived there n.rrs. Jensen '"'jthout
any explanation of 'vhy any question was raised as to
'vhat was covered by the contract she had just executed,
proceeded to give a self-serving statement of what was
in the document and what was not intended to he covererl
by the document. There had been much more elapsed
time than the usual three or four minutes found by this
court to be sufficient, there was no showing that Mrs.
Jensen was excited or that she 'vas acting withont op-
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portunity to deliberate and to acco1nplish a purpose \vith
her declaration.
Of course, the trial court did not believe the daughters of the deceased and this assignn1ent of error beco1nes
in1portant only in the event thi.s Court should order a
new tri·al, and in that event, it \Vould be a guide on the
next trial. It \Vill be referred to again under Point VIII
of this argun1en t.
III.

'T

IT AS El{ROR v-,OR THE COURT TO REFUSE
TO STRIKE THE TESTI~fONY OF MRS. HARPER
OF CON,rERSATIONS "\VITH THE DECEASED
.L-\FTER THE SALE (R. 152-153).
No special point is made of this assignment of
error. The court was doubtful \Vhether this testimony
was ad1nissible and suggested that counsel for respondents make a motion to strike if he deemed the evidence
inadmi.ssible. This motion was made at a proper time
and was denied by the court (R. 152-153). This was
error in the same manner as the original ruling over
respondents' objections \vas error.
IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN PER~IITTING HEARSAY E'TIDENCE OF THE STATEl\IENTS OF
PLAINTIFFS TO THEIR AGENT CONCERNING
INSTRUCTIONS TO PURCHASE- THE 250-FOOT
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TRACT, AND IN FINDING THAT SUCH WERE
TH·E INSTRUCTIONS AND THAT PLAINTIFFS INTENDED TO. PURCHASE THE SAID 25~-FOOT
TRACT. (Appellant's point I)
Having in mind all that has gone before, respondents
contend that the testimony of respondent Sine and of
the agent Dowell, set forth at page 19 of appellant's
brief, was properly admitted as a verbal act creating
the agency between them. It was necessary for the
respondent to show agency and that Dowell was authorized to convey to the deceased the state of mind and intention of the respondent and also because there was a
question as to whose agent Mr. Dowell was. The appellant contend~d that Dowell was the agent of the deceased
(R. 111, 114) and the respondents contended that Dowell
was their agent (R. 111, 112), and the court made finding of fact number 5 on this is8ue (R. 37). Under these
circumstances, the testimony was properly received.
On this question, in Wisconsin Orange Crush Bottling Co. v. Meicher, 198 Wis. 461, 224 N. W. 702, the
que8tion of agency was in dispute and testimony had
been received as to the terms of that agency. At page
704 of 224 N. W., the Wisconsin Supreme Court said:
''It is strenuously ohjected that the testimony given by Charles 1\feicher as to his conversation with Bumpus and detailing the extent
of the agency \vas not competent upon the general
ground that they were self-serving declarations.
\Ve are cited to no ca,~es sustaining surh a prop-
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osition. What Meicher testified to was the arrangement between him and Bumpus. That a
principal may not testify to the terms of the contract made by him with an agent is certainly a
novel contention. How else would the contract
of agency be established~ The burden was upon
Paull to establish the fact of agency, which he
endeavored to do by inference.''
See, also, Rice and Bullen Maulting Co. v. International
Bank, 185 Ill. 427, 56 N. E. 1062; Stevick v~ V ennum, 227 Ill. App. 86; Wigmore, Vol. 6, page 200, quoting Roebke v. Andrews, 26 Wis. 311, 321.
A similar Utah case is Webb and Webb v. Webb, et
al, (decided August 1949), 209 P. 2d 201, in which an
attorney at law was called to testify c~ncerning the meaning and purpose of written docun1ents, including a deed
and a check. The testimony was admitted by the trial
court and in upholding the ruling this Court aaid:
''The conversationa objected to as he resay
"\Vere not used to prove facts therein asserted to
exist hut the fact \vhether such conversations occ:lrred \Vere material issues in the case. The
conversations bet,veen the attorney and the decedent sho\v the attorney's authority and the purposes and lin1itation.s of such authority. The conversations bet\veen the attorney and respondents
sho\ved negotiations for and the consummation
of a rleal \vith respondents in accordance with the
attorney's authority. There was no assertion by
an extra-judicial witness of a material fact for
the purpose of proving the existence of .such
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fact but the fact tha.t such conversations occurred
were' circumstances which showed the purpose
and intention of decedent to convey to the respondents unconditionally. The attorney was the
one who acted for the decedent in the transactions
involved herein and his evidence was. competent
to relate his version thereof and a relation of the
conversationo he had with the principals in the
transaction was not hearsay, even though it necessarily included statements made by the other
parties to the conversation which were not made
in the presence of appellant. ''
Although the testimony wao offered upon the theory
of creating agency (R. 64-66), it was probably admissible to show the state of mind of respondent Jerry Sine,
which was a material issue in the case. Such testimony
was received and approved by this Court in Butterfield
v. Consolidated Fuel Co., 42 Utah 499, 132 P. 559; 1viower
v. Mower, 64 Utah 260, 268-269, 228 P. 911. Appellant
might argue that this latter case supports the declarations of the deceased as testified to by her daughters.
The case is distinguishable on two important grounds:
(a) The declarations in this case are self-serving and
were not such in the nfoV\'er case; and (b) the declarations in the J\!ovver case, although given after alleged
con1pletion of the alleged transaction, were admissible
because, the existence of the transaction, i.e., delivery
of the deed, was an issue in the case. In the case at bar
there is no issue as to \vhether a con tract "\Vas 1nade, and
evidence subseq~ent to the n1aking of it becomes self-
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serving. Testimony offered by respondents concerns
state of mind before contracting, as well as being part
of a verbal act; testimony of the appellant concerns
state of mind after contracting.

v.
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING ANY
TESTIMONY THE EFFECT OF WHICH WAS TO
VARY THE TERMS OF THE WRITTEN UNIF·ORM
REAL ESTATE CONTRACT. (Appellant's point II)
Respondents humbly suggest that ap·pellant has misconceived the meaning of Section 104-48-15, U. C. A. 1943, ·
which is the parol evidence rule. It is not applicable to
this case because the documents themselves were put in
evidence, thereby satisfying the parol evidence rule. And
that parol evidence cannot be received to vary the terms
of a written instrument is not applicable to suits in
equity for reformation of written contracts. Walden v.
Skinner, 101 U. S. 597, 25 L. Ed. 963; 45 Am. Jur. 650.
VI.

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND DECREEING THAT THERE W A·S. A CONTRACT FOR
THE SALE AND PURCHASE OF THE 25lj2 FOO·T
TRACT O·F LAND NOT DESCRIBED IN THE WRITTEN UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT AS
SUCH CONTRACT IS WITHIN THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS. (Appellant's point III)
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It cannot be argued succ~ssfully that the written
docum·ents in this case do"-not satisfy the statute of
frauds. Appellant does not S? contend under her Point
III. Her argument apparently is that respondents seek
to eatablish an agreement different !:rom one reduced
to writing. This, of course, is the essence of suit for
reformation of a contract and the statute of frauds has
been held to be no obstacle. 86 A.L.R. 448, at page 450,
thus states the general rule:
''It is well settled by the weight of authority
that the. Statute of Frauds does not prevent the
reformation of a deed so aa to enlarge the property or interest conveyed.''

VII.
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE
WITNES:S, DOWELL, TO TESTIFY TO CONVERSATIONS AND NEGO·TIATIONS WITH CATHERINE JENSEN IN VIOLATION OF SEC·TION 104-492(3), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1943. (Appellant's
point IV.)
Appellant's brief at page 27 notes a split of authority on the question as to whether or not the statute applies to the testimony of an agent for the party who
sues the deceased's representative. We agree with appellant's statement on that page, that thia Court has
never ruled on this precise question.
At page 35 of her brief, appellant refers to the
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statement at 70 Corpus Juris 2·66, and states that ''possibly the weight of authority" permits an ag·ent of the
surviving party to testify as to transaction-s with the
decedent.
The cases cited by the appellant in this section of
her brief do not involve any statute like the Utah statute,
and Jones in his Comn~entaries on Evidence, at pages
4247 to 4248, says that there are so many different dead
n1an 's statutes and such conflicting rulings between the
states that precedents in one state are of very little
value in other states.
The question under our statute is whether an agent
of the surviving 'P'arty is a ''person directly interested''
in a suit against the estate of a deceased person. This
suit was not started against a representative of the deceased person but against the vendor hers-elf, and it is
no fault of the respondents that Cathrine Jensen died
without having her de position taken, any more than
it is the fault of the appellant. The statute seems to
suggest no distinction between an action brought against
a representative of a deceased person and a suit where
such representative is substituted after the action is
commenced; but th~ argument about sealing the mouths
of witnesses when the mouth of the deceased is s·ealed
by death does not apply so strongly where the parties
in good faith have commenced a suit against a vendor
who would apparently be free to testify to the transactions at the trial.
The question involved in this case was annotated

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25

at 21 A. L. R. 928, and :Subdivision III, annotates this
question ''under p~rovision disqualifying party in int~r
est. '' Our statute states a ''person'' instead of ''party''
~ut requires ''direct'' interest (and the annotation subheading does not. The annotation states the rule that
''in construing this provision it is generally held that
an agent of the surviving party is not a party in interest,
within the meaning of the statute, and .so is not incompetent to testify as to transactions had with the deceased." No Utah cases are listed and neither are there
any cases from California, Idaho or Montana, whose
statutes are like ours, according to the reference 'following Section 104-49-2, U. C. A., 1943. The supplemental
annotation at 54 A. L. R. 264 confirms the general rule,
but likewise contain.s no cases from any of the four
states, and neither do the supplemental annotations.
'Ve have likewise examined the references in the American Digest System under Key No. 140 (16) under the
title, Witnesses, and have found no decision from any
of these four states.
Appellant relies on a Mis.3ouri case which deals with
a party to the contract and the annotation at 21 A. L. R.,
page 927, establishes this as a separate digest heading
and as not contrary to the general rule referred to
under Subdivision III. Numerous, Missouri and some
other cases are cited i~ the annotation, which res'pondent.s submit are not in point And, in any event, appellant's tvvo cases, relied on at pages 28 and 29, have been
overruled, Banking House of Wilcoxon v. Road by Wag-
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ner v. Binder, 187 S. W. 1128 (see 21 A. L. R. at 938)
and Taylor v. George by Allen Estate v. Boeke, 254 S.
W. 858 and Curtis v. Alexander, 257 s. W. 432 (see 54
A. L. R. 265-266).
Appellant argues that the agent Dowell -had s-ome
n1otive to falsify and therefore should have been disqualified as a person interested in the event of thesuit. The testilnony from R. 153 is shown at pages 31
and R2 of appellant's brief. Dowell testified that he
'vas not concerned about coll~ting his commission as he
had a note for that but that he was interested in seeing
Mr. Sine prevail because he feels that he fell down on
the job. ·Appellant tries to convert this into an interest
in the outcome of the action by arguing that perhaps
the respondents would have a suit against the witness
Dowell if they lost this suit. ·That ia, of course, highly
conjectural and no judgment in this action would be
binding on the respondents or Dowell in an action against
him, and what evidence there might be to sup·port such
an action is purely sp~eculative and was not gone into in
this trial. And on thia question two cases from other ·
jurisdictions seem helpful.
In Johnson v. Matthews, 301 Ill. App. 295, 22 N. E.
2d 772, a real estate broker. testified against the estate
of a creditor in a transaction that he was p.ersonally
interested in the success of the debtor for whom he testified. The trial court refused to admit the testimony and
found for the creditor against whom the broker was
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willing to testify. The appellate court, in reversing this
judgment, said:
''The interest which disqualifies a witness
from testifying against an administrator must
be an actual financial interest that will result in
pecuniary gain or loss for th~ witness. It has
nothing whatever to do with his understanding
or feeling. This has been held in many cases in
this and other states.''
The Illinois Statute, Ill. Ann. Stat. C. 51 Sec. 2,
concerns a ''person directly interested in the event
thereof'' in the ·exact language of our statute.
And in re Hilbert's estate, 14 Wash. 475, 128 P. 2d
647, it was held that an attorney could testify against the
estate of a decedent and in behalf of his client, although
he testified that the amount of his fee had not been fixed
and that it depended in part on the outcome of the suit
and that if his client was successful his fee would be
larger. The court held that the attorney's testimony
was properly received, relying on an earlier Washington case, Swindler v. Daniels, 123 Wash. 409, 212 P. 2d
29. The statute being interpreted was Remington's
Revised Statutes, Section 1211, which provides that a
''party in interest'' is incon1petent to testify.
The Utah case of Burnham et al. v. Eschler (June
29, 1940), 208 P. 2d 06, seeins to support the testilnony
of the real estate agent in this case inasn1uch as the
Inotjv-e to falsif~, an(l the interest of the \Yitness appear
to have heen stronger- in that case than in the raRe at
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bar. The question in the Burnham ca.se was whether a
deed executed by the deceased in her lifetime had been
duly deliYered to her daughter with the intention that the
daughter hold title to the property. The husband of the
donee \Vas pern1itted to testify to c.onversations with the
deceased, \vhich \\Tas assigned as error in this court under
the clain1 that the husband was a party directly interested in the event of the action. On this question the
conrt, at page 101 of the Pac. Rep. Advance ·Sheets,
Y'"ol. :?C8, said:
"If Mr. Eschler h-ad a direct interest, it was
an intere~t in the transaction testified to, and
not in the event of this action. In the annotation at L. R. A. 1917A 32, case.s are cited holding
that the interest in the action must be pecuniary,
direct, immediate, and not uncertain, contingent
or remote, and that a husband is not incompetent
because he may become a beneficiary under his.
wife's will or succeed to her property by her intestacy. We held in Olson v. Scott, 61 Utah 42,
210 P. 287, that the plaintiff's husband was entirely competent to testify as to statements made
by the plain tiff's deceased mother to the effect
that certain bank deposits belonged to the plaintiff. Mower v. Mower, 64 Utah 240, 228 P. 911, and
the general rule on this point as stated in 58 Am.
Jur. 195,-- Sec. 319, are in accord with this result.
See also Clawson v. Wallace, 16 Utah 300, 52
P. 9."
To the same effect is Maxfield v. Sainabury, 110 Utah
280, 172 p. 2d 122.
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And so in the case at bar th,e testimony of the witness Dowell, tha.t he wanted the respondents to succeed
beeause he had fallen down on his job of rep-resenting
them, should he taken into account by the court in view
of all of the other facts, including the fact that his commission was fixed by a note and that he ·stood to make
no gain financially by the outcome of the suit. Upon the
reasoning of the court in Burnham v. Eschler, above
noted, and stated by Mr. Justice Wade in his concurring
opinion, this court should uphold the trial court in permitting the witness Dowell to testify.

VIII.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE OF
REFORMATIO·N, BECAUSE THERE IS NO CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE bF A MUTUAL
11ISTAKE IN THE EXECUTION OF THE UNIFORl\f REAL ESTATE CONTRACT. (Appellant's
point V.)
Appellant asks this court to reverse the trial court
on the ground that the evidence wa.s not sufficient to
support the judgment. Appellant states the rule to
require evidence which is clear, satisfactory, and convincing. This is the rule stated in Forrester v. Cook,
77 Utah 137 at 145, 292 P. 206, which case is discussed
by appellant at page 52 of her brief. After using the
above 'vords and noting t)1at a hare preponderance of
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the evidence is not sufficient, the court add.s, "unless
a fair preponderanee of the evidence clearly and satisfactorily eonvinc.es the court of the error.'' Respondents believe thnt the evidence was clear, satisfactory,
and eonvincing anJ also that there was a fair p-reponderance of the eYidence 'Yhich clearly and satisfactorily
con\inced the trial court that reformation should be
granted and that this court 'Yilllike,vise be so convinced.
It may be that the test in this court 'Nill he 'vhether the
trial co1~rt, acting reasonably, could have found the evidence clear and convincing and could have been clearly
and satisfactorily convinced.
Appellant recites some of the testimony of Mr.
Dowell at pages 40 to 47 of her brief. This testimony
shows that Dowell advised th·e deceased that the owner
of the auto co-urt next to the property w·anted to buy it,
after advising her that he was interested in purchasing
the property ''adjoining the Bishop' .s Auto Court.''
Dowell also advised the deceased that the main reason
respondents wanted the property was to straighten out
their property and that they had in mind building a cafe
there. Mrs. Jensen, the deceased, said she had thought
of doing something like that if she had anyone to entrust it to and that, although her children did not want
her to sell it, she wa.s ''glad to he free of it'' becaus·e
she couldn't take care of it. And the price p·er foot was
discussed, relating it to the 75-foot frontage. This
testimony shows clearly the understanding of the parties
that the transaction was to cover the property adjoining
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the Bishop's Auto Court so as to straighten up the
lines and that the deceased was parting with her property there.
The surrounding circumstances are also important,
as observed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Kadow
v. Aluminum Specialty Co., 253 Wis. 76, 33 N. W. 2d
236. That transaction involved some industrial property
with a number of buildings on it, including a barracks,
heating plant, and warehouse. After the transaction was
consummated, it appeared that the boundary line as
described in the deed cut off some of the buildings. 'The
court observed that the parties assumed that the east
line of the property would be such as to include the
buildings and then made this statement:
''At the time the transfer was consummated
he had in his possession an insurance plat of the
buildings showing the buildings to he entirely on
the lots which the Kadows retained. The natural
and reasonable inferences which the court had a
right to draw from the circumstances and the nature of the transaction added to the testimony of
Kadow are sufficient to clearly and convincingly
prove the alleged mistake.''
The important additional circumstance3 in thts case
are that the respondents purchased their property in
1946, as sho1vn by the sketch at page 3 of this brief, and
subsequently added one piece of property adjoining the
pro11erty involved in thi.s transaction. Since Mrs. Jensen
had o\vned this property for man:v~ years, she n1ust haYr
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been a\Yare of the acquisitions of the respondents and
she indicates this by advising Mr. Dowell, when she
learned that it \Yas ~Ir. Sine who wanted to make the
purchase, that "he should pay more for it." Obviously,
the only reason he should pay more than anyone else
"~as that he o"~ned the adjoining property and by obtaining a large piece of frontage he would make the
con1bined piece more valuable than if it were held by
separate o\vners. ~\nd, of course, the only way to n1ake
it more Yalurrble to hin1 \Yas to permit him to straighten
up his lines, as does the sketch in the first 'part of this
brief. Under these circumstances, if a real estate agent
had come to ~Irs. Jensen and advised her th·at the owner
of the auto court wanted to buy the duplex property
but was not interested in the narrow p,iece of vacant
property between the duplex and the auto court, and
that the purchaser was going to tear down the duplex
and erect a building on the ground, she would have supposed that either the o'vner of the -auto court or the real
estate agent was out of his mind. It is unthinkable that
the respondents would have bargained for the duplex
and left a gap between their holdings, and equally unthinkable that Mrs. Jensen would have assumed that
such was the transaction. And relating_ the p,rice to he
paid for the frontage of 75 feet and commenting that
it amounted to more than $100 a foot when a piece down
the street sold for $85 a foot makes inescapable the fact
that }.{r. Dowell and Mrs. Jensen understood each other
and were talking about the sam-e thing.
1
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Use of the numbers for the ·street address was simply a convenient way of referring to the property, inasmuch as the vacant property had no street number.
And of course the respondents had no way of know' width of' the vacant piece as compared to the tract
ing the
upon which the duplex was situated and no way of knowing that it was not all one piece. Mrs. Jensen apparently
referred to the p·roperty in her own mind in the same
way because in her will, made a few months after this
transaction, and before respondents had learned of the
mistake or commenced this suit, she referred to her
property at 656-658 West North Temple, without reference to any vacant piece (probate :file in supplemental
record).
Citing cases on this question probably is not very
helpful to the court. In cases of this kind each must
stand upon its own p~eculiar facts and the test is the impression conveyed to the court. A recital of the facts
is so useless as a precedent that in Gray v. Gray, 108
Utah 338, 160 P. 2d 432, this Court reviewed the evidence but did not recite it in its opinion and simply said
that the evidence is clear and convincing and that is a
suffcient an.s,ver.
The important thing in this case is that the strip
of p·roperty in dispute determines whether respondents
have squared up their property or have simply acquired
an isolated ·pjece in the general vicinity of their other
property. In Rauhut v. O'Donnel, 37 Atl. 2d 66, the Dele\vare Chancery Court granted reformation to include
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one-half of the ground under a party wall as they found
it difficult to believe that p·arties would not agree to sell
the land upon 'vhich the house stood. And respondents
submit that it is equally difficult to believe and for the
deceased to haYe believed that the respondents would
have bargained for anything less than the property
"Thich adjoined theirs.
The deceased and the respondents did not walk
around the property together but this was not necessary
~inee the property 'Yrrs so 'vell known to both of them.
In effect, they were in the san1e position as the partie.:;
in Nordfors v. Knight, 90 Utah114, 60 P. 2d 1115, where
the plaintiff and defendant had walked over the land
together and made some measurements on it and entered
into a bargain which the court held must have been for
the property they had examined and had in mind. At
page 118 of 90 Utah the court comments on the fact
that the parties looked over the land together, although
nothing was said about boundary lines. The court states:
''We deem it unnecessary to make a further
statement of the evidence, as we think the evidence is clear, definite, and convincing that the
parties intended to include this 18.4 acres of
pasture land in the sale. The mere fact that
defendant denies some of the material matters
testified to by plaintiff does not prevent the evidence from being clear, definite, and convincing.
Davidson v. Bailey, 53 Okl. 91, 115 P. 511; Kar.r
v. Pe·arl, 212 Ky. 387, 279 S.W. 631. It rarely
happens that the testimony is undisputed and uncontroverted.''
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In Cram v. Reynolds, 55 Utah 384, 186 P. 100, this
Court reformed a contract to include shares of water
~stock in the belief that the evidence showed that the
parties were thinking of the water when the bargain
was made and that it was omitted from the contract by
mistake. The trial court had refused reformation but
this court revised the judgment, decreed reformation,
and granted sp·ecific performance of the contract. The
farm land in that eas,e without water was as unthinkable a bargain as would caf~ property in our case be
without acquiring the land which gives access to it from
the prop,erty already held by the respondents.
In George v. Frits·ch Loan & Trust Co., 69 Utah 460,
at page 470, 256 P. 400, thi.s court, in a case in which
reformation was denied, laid down this rule:
''From a review of the authorities cited by
counsel in their res·pective briefs, together with
other cases and textwriters, we are of opinion
that the better rule is that where the partiea have
in advance orally agreed upon the terms of a
contract and later in reducing the contract to
writing some of its tern1s are omitted by inadvertence or mistake, no absolute rule can be laid
down, but in determining whether either of the
parties is entitled to have the contract reforn1ed
to express the oral agreement of the parties, much
depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case.''
The surl'ounding circumstances in this case coupled
,,,.ith the conversations had between the agent of the
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respondents and the vendor make plain that the agreement betw·een the parties was for sale of the 75-foot
frontage which "'"ould square up the p·roperty of the
respondents. The evidence of the daughters of the deceased, all of who1n were intere.sted parties, was apparently ignored by the trial court and should be ignored
by this eourt as incompetent and immaterial. Even if
the court considered the testimony and believed it, no
other decision is indicated. If it be assumed that Mrs.
Wheeler and her mother had the conversation to whichnfrs .. Wheeler testified (and the story is just too pat to
be reasonable), it meant that Mrs. Jensen defrauded
the respondents and the respondents should have judgment under their reply instead of the com·plaint, which
error is not prejudicial. The testimony of the other sisters, if ~Irs. Wheeler's is disbelieved, would only serve to
fix the date on which ~Irs. J e_nsen realized that the agreements had inadvertently omitted the vacant strip and
the time, therefore, on which she made up her mind that
she would endeavor to exchange the bargain made for
the more favorable contract.
SUilf~t:ARY

AND CONCLUSION

If respondents are right on the first three points
of this argument most of the testimony of the appellant
was improperly received and should be ignored by the
court. This court can also assume that the trial court
did not believe the testimony of appellant and ignore
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it for that reason without any effort to reconcile the
testimony.
R;espondents contend that their testimony creating
an agency with Mr. Dowell was properly received and
that the similar testim·ony of Mr. Dowell was properly
received as being the verbal act of creating the ·agency;
and that the testimony of Mr. Dowell with the deceased
was not incompetent under the dead man's statute inas.
much as Mr. Dowell was not a person direetly interested
in the event of the suit. These conversations made plain
the ground being bargained for and the conversation of
Mrs. Jensen was equally plain that she understood what
Mr. Sine was offering to purchase. This evidence being
clear, satisfactory, and convincing, the judgment of
the trial court .should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

RICHARDS AND BIRD
Attorneys for Resp.ondents
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